South Africa’s ambitions for digital transformation depend on infrastructure that is often invisible until it stops working.
Every mobile call, electronic payment, emergency alert and online public service relies on a network of fibre routes, telecommunications towers, cables, batteries, data centres and power systems. When these assets are stolen, damaged or deliberately disrupted, the effect extends far beyond the company that owns them.
A stolen cable can disconnect a community. A vandalised tower can interrupt emergency communications. A damaged fibre route can affect businesses, schools, hospitals, banks and government services. Repeated attacks also divert investment away from expanding and improving networks towards repairing and protecting existing infrastructure.
Infrastructure crime must therefore be understood for what it is: a threat to South Africa’s economic resilience, digital inclusion and delivery of essential services.
The scale of the problem
The Independent Communications Authority of South Africa’s State of the ICT Sector Report of South Africa 2026 shows that theft and vandalism cost the telecommunications sector more than R340 million in 2025.
The cost of equipment theft increased from R69.6 million in 2024 to R201.5 million in 2025 - an increase of approximately 189%. Although reported vandalism costs declined from R213.8 million to R140.9 million, the sharp increase in theft shows that the threat is changing rather than disappearing.
The Communications Risk Information Centre’s Telecommunications Sector Report 2026 provides some evidence that sustained intervention can make a difference. According to the report, telecommunications infrastructure crime declined from 15,917 incidents in the previous financial year to 9,579 incidents in 2025/26 - a reduction of about 40%.
Battery theft reportedly fell by approximately 90%, while about one in six attempted infrastructure crimes was stopped before completion. These improvements reflect the value of stronger site protection, monitoring, intelligence-sharing and coordinated responses.
However, the figures do not justify complacency. Copper-cable theft remained persistent at an average of 256 incidents a month. The Western Cape reportedly experienced an increase in infrastructure crime, with incidents rising from 553 to 1,184.
There is also a serious gap between arrests and convictions. COMRiC reports that 1,280 suspects were arrested in connection with telecommunications infrastructure crime, but only 291 convictions were secured. This represents an arrest-to-conviction rate of 22.7%.
Arrests are important, but they do not provide adequate deterrence when cases do not result in convictions or when the organised networks behind the crimes remain operational.
More than a telecommunications problem
The theft and destruction of communications infrastructure cannot be separated from attacks on electricity, rail, water, municipal and other essential infrastructure.
These systems depend on one another. Telecommunications networks need reliable electricity. Electricity, transport and water operators need communications systems to monitor infrastructure, coordinate personnel and respond to incidents. Financial institutions, emergency services and government platforms depend on both physical connectivity and secure digital systems.
A failure in one network can therefore create disruption across several others.
The distinction between physical and digital infrastructure is also becoming less clear in practice. A cyberattack may compromise a digital system, while a stolen cable or damaged power supply can prevent that system from operating or recovering. Civil unrest or criminal activity can stop technicians from reaching affected sites. A disrupted supply chain can delay the replacement of critical equipment.
This does not mean that cybercrime and physical infrastructure crime are the same. They require different technical, legal and enforcement responses. But they form part of an increasingly connected national risk environment that cannot be addressed in separate institutional silos.
Economic sabotage in effect
In its May 2026 Budget Vote, the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition described cable theft, vandalism and the destruction of industrial infrastructure as economic sabotage against jobs and productive capacity.
That description reflects the consequences of these crimes.
Not every act of cable theft or vandalism is necessarily prosecuted under an offence formally described as “economic sabotage”. Depending on the facts, offenders may be charged with theft, malicious injury to property, damage to essential infrastructure or offences associated with organised crime.
But the economic effect is clear. Deliberately destroying the infrastructure that supports productive activity, public services and community connectivity weakens the country’s ability to grow and function.
The cost is ultimately carried by the public. Communities experience interrupted services. Businesses lose trading time. Network operators incur repair and security costs. The state loses economic activity and tax revenue. Capital that could have funded network expansion is redirected towards replacing stolen equipment and repeatedly repairing damaged sites.
A coordinated response is working - but must go further
The reported reduction in telecommunications infrastructure incidents shows that coordinated action can produce measurable results.
Individual operators have strengthened physical security, surveillance, monitoring and rapid-response measures. Industry collaboration has improved intelligence-sharing. Partnerships with law-enforcement agencies have supported arrests and the disruption of criminal activity.
These efforts must continue, but the scale and interconnected nature of the problem require a broader national response.
First, South Africa needs better coordination between telecommunications operators, energy and transport entities, municipalities, law-enforcement agencies, prosecutors and regulators. Infrastructure criminals often target multiple sectors and move between assets, areas and methods in response to security measures.
Second, intelligence-sharing must occur within clear legal and competition-law safeguards. Institutions need to share relevant information quickly while protecting personal information, commercially sensitive information and the integrity of criminal investigations.
Third, enforcement must focus on organised criminal networks and the markets that make infrastructure theft profitable. Arresting individuals at damaged sites will have limited long-term effect if the buyers, processors, transporters and syndicates behind the trade remain untouched.
Fourth, greater attention must be paid to the progression of cases through the criminal justice system. The gap between arrests and convictions points to possible weaknesses in investigation, evidence preservation, prosecution and case management. These weaknesses require closer examination.
Fifth, affected communities must be treated as partners. Telecommunications infrastructure serves the community in which it is located. Public awareness, trusted reporting channels and cooperation with local stakeholders can help identify suspicious conduct before damage occurs. This participation must be supported by safe reporting mechanisms and appropriate protection for those who provide information.
Protecting connectivity is a public-interest responsibility
The telecommunications industry accepts that it has a direct responsibility to protect its networks, invest in resilience and cooperate with the authorities. However, operators cannot dismantle organised criminal markets or resolve weaknesses across the criminal justice system on their own.
Protecting communications infrastructure is not simply about protecting private property. It is about protecting access to opportunity, public services and participation in an increasingly digital society.
South Africa is seeking to expand broadband coverage, improve digital government, support online education, grow digital businesses and connect underserved communities. Those objectives become harder and more expensive when existing infrastructure is repeatedly stolen or destroyed.
The recent reduction in reported incidents is encouraging. It shows that prevention, intelligence-sharing and collaboration can work. At the same time, persistent copper-cable theft, changing criminal methods and low conviction outcomes show that the problem is far from resolved.
South Africa cannot build a resilient and inclusive digital economy on infrastructure it cannot protect. Safeguarding the networks that connect the country must be treated as a shared national priority - supported by coordinated prevention, effective enforcement, successful prosecution and sustained cooperation between industry, government and communities.
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